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To  examine  the extent  to which the Conservation Reserve Program  (CRP)
brings  about a reduction in surplus commodity production, I develop  a
simple model  that  incorporates the  farm-level  production effects of  entry
into  the Reserve.  The model  is  used to  estimate  the reduction in
aggregate program crop  acreage under two CRP program alternatives:  (1)
the  "base bite,"  which requires a proportional reduction in a farm's
commodity base as  a condition of CRP entry  (the  current  law) and  (2) no
base bite, which for supply control purposes would rely upon a
"displacement" of acreage  actually available  for planting.  Data from  the
first  four rounds  of CRP bidding permit comparison of the  supply control
impacts  of  the alternative provisions.  The base bite  is  shown  to have
reduced aggregate program crop plantings by 8.7 million acres,  while
displacement would have reduced plantings by 8.0 million acres.
1The Conservation Reserve  and Supply Control:
Is  the  Base Bite the  Best  Bet?
Steven J. Taff
Section  1:  Introduction
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was an integral part of  the
compromise between  agricultural and environmental  interests in the passage
of  the  1985  Food Security Act.  Reflecting this compromise,  the  CRP has
two principal goals:  erosion reduction and supply reduction.  In this
paper, I examine the  supply-control facets  of  the program, using a simple
model of  cropland allocation decisions  that embodies  the  specifics of CRP
rules  as presently specified.
Under the CRP,  landowners  agree  to  retire highly erodible cropland 1
for  ten years  in exchange  for an annual payment.  Farmers submit  sealed
bids  to  the USDA, indicating  the  total of  their  eligible acreage  that  they
would enter into  the Reserve and the  payment per acre  that  they would be
willing to  accept  annually as  compensation.  The USDA then announces  the
maximum accepted bid level  (the  "bid cap")  for the multi-county pool in
which the  farm is  located.  All parcels bid at  that rate  or  lower in the
pool are  enrolled.  Through February 1987,  17.7 million acres have been
enrolled nationwide.
Assistant Professor  and Extension Economist, Department  of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.  This study
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Special  thanks  to  Michael Linsenbigler of  the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service  for data set  support  and to  Wiktor Adamowicz,
Ford Runge,  and Athanasios Athanasenas  for valuable  comments.The  focus  of  this  paper  is  the CRP's  "base bite,"  a feature designed
to  give  a conservation program some  supply control impact  over and above
the reduction  in production  that might result from retiring the  CRP acres
themselves.  For each acre  entered  into the Reserve,  a farm's  aggregate
acreage base  is  reduced  (for the period of the  contract) by the  ratio of
the CRP land to  the  farm's  total  cropland.  A  farmer with more than one
crop acreage base can allocate the bite against  one or more of these
2 bases.  In  "retiring"  a portion of  each enrollee's base  for  the duration
of the  CRP contract, the government  reduces  its  obligations  for any
payments  (notably deficiency payments)  tied to  crop acreage bases.  This
reduction in payments could be balanced against the  annual CRP rental
payment obligated in the  process, but  such a balancing  is not performed
here.  I examine only the production effects  of the base bite.
If  there were no base bite provision in the CRP,  there  might still  be
some  associated reduction in program crop  acreage.  This phenomenon, which
I call  "displacement,"  results when the amount of land entered into  the
CRP  on a particular farm is  sufficiently large  to  reduce  the amount  of
remaining  land that could be  legally planted to  program crops.  Could
displacement ever result in more production cut-backs  than those
accomplished by the base bite?  Yes,  under  conditions  to be developed  in
this paper.
In Section 2, I show the base bite's  intended effects by means of a
simple algebraic representation of federal land retirement law.  The model
allows  as  well the portrayal  of production under a hypothetical CRP with
no base bite.  In Section 3, I use  the model to  represent CRP-altered
production levels with  and without a bite.  Section 4 estimates  the
2reduction in program crop acreage brought about by CRP  entries during  the
first  four rounds  of bidding.  Section 5 discusses  the results.
Section 2:  The Model
CRP enrollment can reduce production of  a particular crop  in  two
ways.  First, production will  decrease if  the entry reduces  the amount of
land  that  is  agronomically suitable  for that  crop.  Second, production
will  decrease  if the CRP entry reduces  the amount of land on which the
crop can be legally grown.  This  contraction could occur through  the base
bite, which reduces  "permitted plantings,"  the amount of land that can be
legally allocated to  crop production, or  through displacement, whereby
the  CRP reduces  the amount of  land left for planting particular crops
("available acres").
The relative  impacts of  the  base bite  and displacement  are critical
in determining the  supply control effectiveness  of the  CRP and lie at  the
heart of  this  analysis.  To  anticipate:  the base bite  is  the superior
supply-control tool  on those  farms on which available  acres exceeds
permitted plantings  (no displacement) and that the  opposite holds when
available  acres constrain permitted plantings  (some displacement).  I show
this by a simple one-crop model,  then expand it  into  a multi-crop
framework.  The model  is  principally a representation of federal  land
retirement laws;  for  the most part,  it  does not rely upon assumptions
about either landowner  or government behavior.  It can be  thought of as  a
particular  specification of a more  general supply-response model  such as
those developed by Lee  and Helmberger  (1986),  among others.
Behavioral assumptions  and maximizing models  are unnecessary to
estimate program crop production, I argue, because program crop supply and
3crop prices  are  largely untethered in the presence  of government program,
as  Lee  and Helmberger point out.  Planting allocations need not be  treated
in an optimizing framework, because  legal production constraints  and
incentives to  maintain base mean that  farmers plant all  they legally and
agronomically can of a program crop.  Planting levels  can instead be
modeled using the simple  formulation of the law employed here.  The model
draws  attention to  the  critical nature of legal,  as  opposed to agronomic
or  financial, constraints when government supply-control programs  are  in
effect.
Single-Crop  System
Let C be  the  farm's  total  cropland, B be  its  single crop acreage
base, R be the acreage  entered into  the  CRP, and j and k be required set-
aside and optional paid land diversion percentages, respectively.  Assume
that  the  farmer makes  land allocation decisions in  this order:  CRP  first,
then required ARP/PLD idling, then the  commodity crop,  and finally any
non-program crop  (if  land remains).  "Permitted plantings"  is  the legal
acreage  limit for  the  program crop, while  "available acres"  is  the amount
of  land remaining after ARP, PLD,  and CRP idling have been designated.
The base bite,  required as a condition for CRP entry, reduces  total
farm acreage base by some  factor P.  Generally, then, permitted plantings
with CRP entry  is  (l-j-k)(l-/)B.  Under current law, P=R/C.  Since  setting
the bite  factor to zero  is  equivalent  to  removing the bite  entirely, the
analysis conducted here  effectively compares CRP-induced planting
reductions when P=R/C  (bite) with reductions if P=0  (no bite).
The farm acreage base under a base bite becomes  N=(1-R/C)B.  Because
N<B, permitted plantings with a bite  are always  less  than if there  were no
bite.  But  if  there were no  bite, set-asides,  (j+k)B, would be  larger
and, so,  available acres would be  smaller.
4Displacement  occurs when permitted plantings  is  constrained by
available  acres.  It  can be  shown that  this happens  if R>C-N with a bite,
and if R>C-B with no bite.  But  it  also can be shown  that R>C-N iff R>C,
which is  impossible:  displacement occurs  only under a no-bite provision.
The  calculations necessary to  determine  the  amount of land allocated to
each use,  with and without the CRP  and with and without  the base bite,  are
presented in Figure 1.  In Figure 2, I show these allocations
schematically.
Critical  for present purposes  is  the possibility that on some farms
displacement might even exceed the reduction in planting attributable to
the base bite.  This would be  the case  if available  acres with no bite
would be less  than permitted plantings with a bite,  a condition that
reduces to
R >  C  - B + RB(l-j-k).
C
This possibility is  also represented in Figure 2.
Multiple-crop system
Because  farmers  can allocate the base bite  among any or all  existing
bases,  the model needs  to be expanded to  represent more than one program
crop.  In Figure 3, the  i=1,  ..,I  subscripts  denote each program crop
for which a farmer may have an established base.  Land utilization
decisions are  as before:  CRP  first,  followed by required  set-asides  and
optional  PLDs,  program crops,  and other crops.  Program crops are assumed
to be selected in decreasing order of their net  returns per  acre.  The
total base bite  is  allocated over  one or more of a farm's  existing bases,
at  the farmer's  option,  the  proportion shown by ai,  where Sa.=l.O  for
each farm.  Individual bases become
N.i  B.  - a.RB/C 
5Figure  1:  Available acres  and Permitted Plantings--One Crop  System
No  CRP  CRP with bite  CRP without bite
CRP  0  R  R
ARP/PLD  (j+k)B  (j+k)N  (j+k)B
Permitted  (1-j-k)B  (l-j-k)N  (l-j-k)B
Available  C-(j+k)B  C-R-(j+k)N  C-R-(j+k)B
Other crops  C-B  C-R-N  C-R-B
Note:  N=(1-R/C)B
6Figure  2:  Land allocation under base bite  and no-bite provisions
No CRP  CRP with Bite  CRP with no bite
No Displacement  Some Displacement
C  -
0  R
B  - -~  R- 
I  R





P  Planted to program crop  N  CRP-reduced base
I  Idled by ARP/PLD  R  CRP acres
C  Total  cropland  O  Planted to non-program crop
B  Original base
7Figure 3:  Available and Permitted Plantings--Multi-Crop System
No CRP  CRP with bite  CRP without bite
CRP  O  R  R
ARP/PLD  2(ji+ki)Bi  E(ji+ki)Ni  S(ji+ki)Bi
Permitted  E(l-ji-ki)Bi  Z(l-j  -ki)Ni  Z(l-j  -ki)Bi
Available  C-Z(ji+ki)Bi  C-R-(j  i+ki)Ni  C-R-Z(ji+ki)Bi





1  1  1.
8Required idling and paid diversions  apply only  to  crops  for which  the
farmer enrolls,  and not  all  crops  for which a farm has  a base need be
enrolled.
Displacement  (available acres  less  than permitted plantings)  occurs
on  an aggregate basis  if R>C-EB. when there  is  no bite.  (As was  the  case
with the  single-crop model,  displacement  can never occur under a base bite
4 provision. )  Farms under a no-bite  provision would plant less  than they
do under a bite  if available  acres with no-bite  is  less  than permitted
plantings with a bite.  This condition reduces  to
(1)  R  >  C  - B + Z(l-ji-ki)aiRB/C 
The  relative effectiveness  (for  supply control purposes) of
displacement over  the base bite, then, depends upon the  aggregate  impact
of farms  on which  (1) would hold if  there were no  bite.  The  overall
message of  the single-crop model  remains unchanged:  the possibility of
displacement under  a no-bite  provision means  that the bite  is  not
automatically  the  superior  supply-control instrument.
Section  3:  Aggregate  Production
The  important distinction for our purposes  is  aggregate production on
CRP  farms with an without a base bite.  (Non-CRP farms are  assumed to be
unaffected by  the program.)  Under a base bite, I have  shown, displacement
can never occur.  Total  actual plantings under a base bite  is  simply the
aggregate of permitted plantings:
XI
(2)  ZZ(l-ji-ki)Nix  ,
9where X is  the  set of  CRP  enrollees.  Without a base bite,  total
plantings  (where Q and S are  the  sets  of  farms on which displacement does
not or  does occur,  respectively) would be the sum of aggregate plantings
for constrained and unconstrained farms:
QI  S  I
(3)  2Z(l-ji-ki)Niq +  2[C  - Rs  - (ji+ki)Bis].
Total plantings with the bite  is  less  than total  plantings without the
bite  if  (2)  <  (3).  The extent to  which this holds would have  to be
determined empirically:  there is  no a priori justification for  either the
base bite  or  displacement as  the better supply control  tool.
Unfortunately, available  data do not permit a direct comparison of  the  two
planting levels.  A more  indirect  comparison is  possible, however, as  I
show in the next  section.
Section 4:  The Evidence
Which provision, then, would be  the better supply controller?  I
present here evidence  from the  first four  CRP rounds  (through February
1987),  in which over 152,000 contracts covering over  17 million acres  were
signed.  The two provisions'  actual and hypothetical effects  on aggregate
program crop production are measured by estimating reductions  in permitted
plantings under each.  The procedure  is  consistently biased in favor of
the base bite provision.  I assume the same  "slippage"--a less  than one-
to-one link between a retired acre and the associated reduction  in
production--regardless  of the presence or absence of the base bite.  I
also assume  that  the distribution of  idled acres  across crops will be the
same  for equivalent acreage reductions.  Finally, I ignore altered
production levels attributable  to varying land quality or market effects.
10(See  Boggess;  Hertel  and Preckel;  Dicks,  et al.;  and Webb,  et  al.  for
other approaches.)
The data set  is  the  official ASCS  listing of all CRP contracts  signed
to  date.  Each record summarizes an individual  contract, with associated
payments, base  reduction, and required conservation practice information.
Farmers  can allocate  the base bite among any or all  of  their bases, but
the  data set permits determination only of  the aggregate  farm acreage
base.  Additionally,  the data report only those bases  actually selected
for biting, not  all bases on the farm.  If no bite happens to  be allocated
to  a particular crop,  it  might be  the case  that  the farmer chose not to
bite  that crop's base  or  it might be  the case  that  the  farm has no base  in
that  crop.  The data do not permit  this distinction.
Figure 4 shows  the distribution of base bite  allocations  among crops
for  all  142,852  farms  that were subject to  the base bite.  (Seven percent
of  the CRP contracts were on farms  that have no  base to  bite.  These farms
are not  subject to  legal planting constraints  of the  type considered
here.)  The numbers  in the  last column treat the whole  set  of CRP
participants  as  if it  were one  farm.  One  can think of these  as  the
diminution in each commodity's  base that each additional  CRP acre brings
with it.
The data do not permit calculation of available  acres  or  of permitted
plantings by crop, because  the  individual crop acreage bases  B. cannot be
determined.  Consequently, we  cannot make the direct comparison of  the
relative magnitudes of plantings required in  (3).  We can, however,
determine  the required reduction  in plantings under the  alternate
provisions,  as  I show now.
11Figure  4:  Distribution of base bites by crop:  U.S.;  through February  1987
Number  of CRP  Proportion
contracts biting  Total  of bite
at least this  Reduction in  assigned
Crop  crop base  base  (acres)  to  crop
Corn  69,469  2,320,179  .20
Wheat  72,801  5,110,445  .45
Oats  34,370  553,891  .05
Barley  19,524  1,301,026  .11
Sorghum  30,417  1,404,801  .12
ELS  cotton  18  514  (negl.)
Rice  82  2,884  (negl.)
Upland cotton  7,453  751,286  .07
Tobacco  590  3,060  (negl.)
Peanuts  179  11,044  (negl.)
Total Base Bite  11,459,129
SOURCE:  Author's calculations  from USDA ASCS data.
12In Figure  5, the reduction  in permitted plantings attributable  to  the
base bite,  (l-ji)aiBR/C,  as  in Figure 5.  (Only required set-asides  are
calculated, since  the optional paid diversions are  not reported in  the
available  data.  This has  the  effect of overstating supply reduction
through the base bite).  Because permitted plantings  are  subject  to  set-
aside  requirements, a one  acre  reduction  (by the base bite)  in a crop's
base  leads  to  a less  than one acre  reduction in that  crop's production.
Under a no-bite system, 78,650  (51%)  of the  enrollees would be subject
to  displacement  (Figure 6).  The  critical  comparison is  the difference
between acreage  reductions attributable  to  the base bite  and those which
would be brought about by displacement.  (As discussed above, only  those
farms  on which  (1) holds would plant  less under a no-bite provision.  This
is  a subset of the  farms  on which displacement would occur.)  In Figure 7,
I subtract,  respectively, permitted plantings with a bite and available
acres  with no bite  from permitted plantings with no  CRP at  all.  This
reduces  to
XI  S I
(4)  Z[(l-ji-k)a  iixBxR/Cx]  -[ZBi  -C +Rs].
If  (4) is positive,  the base bite  is  the preferable provision for
supply control.  If negative, no-bite  is better.  This  relationship  is
fully determinable with available data.
Figure  8 traces  the  actual reduction in permitted plantings and  the
hypothetical reduction which would be accomplished by displacement over
the  first four rounds of CRP enrollment.  Aside from the  first round,
displacement ran from 89-98%  of  the base-bite  reduction.  The cumulative
13Figure  5:  Annual planting reductions  due  to  CRP base-bite:  U.S.,  through
February 1987
Reduction in
Required  permitted plantings
Crop  Reduction (percent)  (acres)
Corn  20  1,856,143
Wheat  27.5  3,705,073
Oats  20  443,113
Barley  20  1,040,821
Sorghum  20  1,123,841
ELS Cotton  15  437
Rice  35  1,875
Upland Cotton  25  563,464
TOTAL  8,734,767
Note:  Tobacco  and peanut bases  are also eligible for  the CRP bite, but
these crops operate under  allotment programs rather than required set-
asides,  so  production effects can't be  traced.  These  two crops account
for 0.1%  of  the base bite  achieved in  the first  four rounds  on CRP
enrollment.
SOURCE:  Author's calculations  from USDA ASCS  data.
14Figure  6:  Distribution of  CRP contracts by constraint  and provision:
U.S.,  through February 1987.
Provision
Bite  No  Bite
No  Displacement  142,852  (X)  64,202  (Q)
Some Displacement  0  (Y)  78,650  (S)
Note:  10,084 farms with no base  are excluded from this analysis.
SOURCE:  Author's calculations  from USDA ASCS data.
15Figure  7:  Reduction in plantings  due  to  CRP
Provision
Bite  No  Bite
XI
No  Displacement  E2(l-ji-ki)ixRxBx/Cx 0
S I
Some  Displacement  n/a  Z[2B  -C +R ]
16reduction  shows  8.7 million acres  to  the  base bite  and 8.0 million acres
to  displacement.  Consequently,  (4) is positive:  a CRP with a base bite
has been slightly  superior to  a no-bite  CRP--with respect  to  supply
reduction.
Section 5:  Discussion
The analysis  is biased in  favor of  the base bite  in two ways.
First, by not  including  the paid  land diversion factor k.,  I overstate  the
reduction in permitted plantings attributable  to  the bite.  Second, by
holding  enrolled acres  per farm R  fixed under the hypothetical no-bite
provision, I may understate  the supply reduction attributable to
displacement.  I here  elaborate on the second point.
Would a participating farm be  likely to  put even more land  into the
Reserve  in the  absence of a base bite?  Consider  the simple net returns
function
NR =  (l-j-k)mr(1-R/C)B + pR + t  (C-R-(1-R/C)B),
where p  is  the CRP rental payment  and Xm  , X  are per-acre net returns  from
a
commodity crops  and non-program crops,  respectively.  All other  symbols
are  as  before.  The incremental opportunity cost of CRP  entry, aNR/aR,  is
p  =  (l-j-k)(B/C)n  +  r (1-B/C). m  a
If  there were  no base bite,  the opportunity cost  of  CRP entry would be
simply the  return from  the non-program crop,  a , up  to  the  level  (C-B),
where displacement would kick in.  After  that, each CRP  acre would cost
the  foregone program crop  income,  (l-j-k)w  . So total  opportunity
17Figure  8:  Total reduction  in plantings  (acres) compared to  no  CRP:  U.S.,
through February 1987.
Reduction in Plantings  (acres)
Round  Base Bite  Displacement
1  338,863  227,058
2  1,345,235  1,220,334
3  2,432,887  3,376,148
4  4,617,781  4,115,591
8,734,767  7,989,131
SOURCE:  Author's calculations  from USDA ASCS data.
18cost  of R acres with a bite would be  greater than total  opportunity cost
with  no bite  if
p R - (C-B)a  +  (l-j-k)rm(R-(C-B)))  > 0.
a  m
This holds  for  all
t  (1-j-k) >  t 
m  a
Since  (j+k) ranges  from 0.20  to  0.35  for program crops under current law,
the base bite  is more  expensive to  the farmer  if non-program crops  return
less  than 65-80%  of the net returns  of program crops.  Whenever this
holds,  removal  of the base bite would reduce the opportunity  cost of  CRP
entry for  the  farmer and so,  presumably, increase the number of acres
entered.
But why wouldn't a farmer have put all  eligible  land into the  CRP  in
the  first place?  In a single-crop framework,  all eligible  land will be
entered if p > p , and removal  of the base bite would not  (could not)
stimulate additional entry on that  farm.  In a multi-crop framework,
however, p might be  large enough  to  entice entry to  a level  sufficient
to  remove  (through the base bite)  one crop's base  and yet not large
enough  to  entice total  entry,  because p < p.  for some  other program crop.
In this  instance, removal  of the base bite might reduce the  opportunity
cost of entry to  some pi,  such that pj  > p >  pi.  Again, removal  of the
bite  in  this instance would increase  the level  of  entry for participating
farmers  and, hence,  increase  the displacement of program crop acreage  as
well.
Section 6..  Conclusion
The base bite  (as presently specified under  law) has  been shown to  be
marginally superior to  displacement, with respect:  to  supply control.  A
19larger bite  (some  3>R/C)  would increase  its  relative effectiveness.  A
logical next  item on the  research agenda  is  to  examine  the dollar cost of
the bite.  Federal  commodity program expenditure reduction was  an  implicit
goal of the CRP  in general  and the base bite  in particular.  If  there were
no bite,  farmers could probably, because of  lower opportunity costs, bid
less  than they  do now.  The per-acre  cost of the Reserve could be  lower
(if a true bidding system is maintained),  and supply reduction  (if  the
bite remains  at present levels) would be roughly  the same.  However, under
a no-bite  CRP,  the  government could not require  in exchange some  of the
farm's base.  As  a result, price-support payments would not be  lowered as
they are under the present CRP.  (Although in the  long run they might
decline  as  displacement reduces historic plantings.  See Note  5.)  In
addition, if either  the base bite or displacement succeed in
significantly lowering program crop production, then associated market
price  increases could reduce government budget exposure by lowering
required per-bushel  deficiency payments.  The net  effect of such
adjustments  is worthy of exploration.
20NOTES
CRP eligibility  is  restricted to  currently cropped lands  that are:
(a) in SCS capability classes VI-VIII,  (b) class  II-V lands  that  are
eroding at more  than three times  the  SCS-determined tolerance rate  ("3-T"
or greater),  (c) lands  that exhibit  severe gullying  and are eroding at 2T
or more, or  (d) lands with an  Erodibility  Index of  8 or more  that are
eroding at  a rate  greater than IT.
A  farm's  official crop acreage base  is  a number (linked to  historic
planting records) used by ASCS  to  determine  the magnitude of the
deficiency payments  for that commodity.  The base  is  an accounting entity,
not a geographical  designation;  hence,  a particular acre  should not be
thought of  as  a "base  acre" or  a "non-base acre."  Deficiency payments  are
calculated for  output "grown" on  the farm's  established base at  the
established base yield.  The  farmer can plant no more of a program crop
than its  permitted acreage,  which is  the established base  in  that crop,
less  any set-aside or PLD.
The  1985  Food Security Act provides  three  instruments to  control
supply--acreage  limitations,  set-asides, and required diversions.  All
three,  often used interchangeably  in the  literature, require  that  the
farmer not plant some  cropland, in exchange for  government subsidies.  A
"set-aside program" would require  that  the farmer not plant a particular
proportion of  "planted acres."  An "acreage limitation program" would
require  that  the farmer not plant a particular proportion of the  crop
acreage base.  "Required diversions" are additional  to the  other two  and
might be  tied either to base or  to planted acres.  In implementing  the
bill,  the  USDA selected an acreage  limitation program with a small
21required diversion tied  to base.  An optional paid land diversion for  feed
grains  was added in  1987.  The  distinctions are  important  to  the extent
that  the base, which is  the average  of  several years of planted and
considered-planted acres,  differs from planted acres, which is  a one-year
record only.  In this paper,  I follow the convention of referring to  the
present acreage limitation plus  required diversion programs  as  "ARP" and
the optional paid land diversion as  "PLD."
4Although displacement  of total program crop  acreage can never occur
under a base bite,  the available  acres constraint could hold for a single
crop's planting levels.  Consider the specific example of the  effect of
the base bite  on a farm which has  a corn base, among others.  Assume  that
corn is  the most lucrative crop and so will be planted up  to  legal  limits
whenever possible.  The difference between corn planting levels with and
without the bite  is dependent upon a  ,  the  proportion of the bite
allocated to  the corn base.  The  lower  is  a , the closer  is  N  to  B  and ~~c  ~  c  c
the more  equal  (for corn supply control purposes)  are  the  two provisions.
With the base bite, total  available acres would constrain permitted corn
plantings  if
(l-jc-kc)(B -a BR/C)  >  C  - R  - Z(ji+ki)(Bi-aiBR/C)
This  reduces  to
I
R >  C  - N  - Z(j+k.)N.
ifc
But  if this constraint on corn plantings happens to hold,  it must  follow
that no  other program crops will be grown, because the  farmer  (by
assumption) plants  as  much corn  (the most  lucrative crop) as  is  legally
allowed.  Set-asides  (and plantings)  for non-corn program crops  will
22therefore be  unnecessary.  As  a result,  the physical constraint on corn
holds  only  if  R>C-N  with a base bite and, by similar reasoning,  if R>C-B
c  C
with no  bite.  It can be  shown that  the R>C-N  constraint holds  if
c
R  >  C  C  cB
C-a B c  c
which is  possible  for O<a <1.  It  could be the  case,  therefore,  that
displacement of a particular crop  occurs under a base bite,  even though
this would never hold for  aggregate production.
5The bite may be  favored in yet another way.  A farm's base  can be
thought of as  a "right"  to  government payments when market prices  are  low.
In a dynamic context,  farmers may wish to  preserve base  in order  to
maintain marketing flexibility,  to  spread risk.  The base bite  then
carries with it an  implicit increase  in risk exposure, because it  reduces
flexibility.  Presumably,  this  increase  in risk adds  to  the opportunity
cost of CRP entry, and removal  of  the bite would lower opportunity costs
and increase CRP entry.  One might counter  that displacement also  can
increase risk  in a same  dynamic context.  If  farmers don't plant a
particular program crop over a period of years,  they run  the risk of
lowering their  "historic plantings"  for  that crop.  By traditional USDA
rules  this could lower the  established base and, by the preceding
arguments,  increase  the risk faced by the  farmer.
Which risk premium is  the higher, that  caused by the base bite or
that  caused by displacement,  is  a measurement not undertaken here.
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